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  • Supervision of the EPR reactor: Information notice No. 15
    July 2013 AREVA NP informed ASN that the first of these valves had been installed upside down Further to this error the ASN approved inspection body responsible for monitoring these operations suspended performance of the equipment assembly and transfer operations while AREVA NP identified the causes of this deviation and proposed satisfactory corrective measures The analysis of the causes of the deviation revealed that it resulted firstly from human and organisational related factors and secondly from shortcomings in the specification of the requirements applicable to the installation operations and their monitoring ASN asked AREVA NP to make the necessary changes in the organisation and the NPE installation documentation ASN accepted that implementation of these changes be staggered in time considering that installation of the three way valves could be continued once the documentation had undergone a first modification and on condition that AREVA NP ensures full tracking of the inspections performed In early September 2013 AREVA NP proposed ASN a method for identifying and correcting all the shortcomings in the technical documentation used for the first installation sequence such that each requirement to be met during the operations is correctly specified with a document certifying the results of the required inspections This method will also be applied for the subsequent sequences ASN considers that the method proposed by AREVA NP allows continuous improvement in the documentation while guaranteeing application of all the associated requirements ASN thus informed AREVA NP on 24th September 2013 that the first installation sequence operations could be resumed under the surveillance of the approved inspection bodies Preparation for operation of the Flamanville 3 reactor The EDF entity responsible for operation of the future Flamanville 3 EPR reactor called Flamanville 3 NPP currently comprises about 350 employees The reactor construction activities are supervised by another EDF entity called Aménagement de Flamanville 3 Flamanville 3 Development which is also in charge of the start up operations A process is currently underway to gradually transfer responsibility for operation and maintenance of the structures systems and components from the Flamanville 3 Development entity to the Flamanville 3 NPP entity in preparation for the commissioning of the reactor The steps of this process enable the NPP staff to acquire the necessary skills familiarise themselves with the reactor equipment produce the operating documentation and develop the appropriate tools In this preliminary phase ASN s oversight of the preparation of the entity tasked with future operation of the reactor is based on two types of action an annual meeting with senior management of the Flamanville 3 NPP entity and its representatives at which the future licensee presents its review of the preparation for reactor operation over the past year and its prospects for the year to come these meetings have been held since 2011 on site inspections specifically dedicated to the Flamanville 3 NPP one per year between 2010 and 2012 and two scheduled in 2013 on the themes of organisation the development of skills production of the operating documentation and transfer of

    Original URL path: http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Inspections/Supervision-of-the-epr-reactor/ASN-s-supervision-of-the-Flamanville-3-reactor-construction-EPR-News/Supervision-of-the-EPR-reactor-Information-notice-No.-15 (2016-01-29)
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  • Supervision of the EPR reactor: Information notice No. 14
    unannounced inspection was therefore carried out on 10 December 2012 the date on which the breach was opened in the dam to be removed this inspection verified the technical and organisational measures taken by EDF for performance of these operations In particular the removal of the dam during this third step entails the dispersion of suspended solids sand earth etc into the water of the channel from the structure EDF must minimise the dispersion of these solids in order to limit their impact on the reactors in operation The licensee must in particular avoid a malfunction of the reactor cooling water filtration systems The measures taken by EDF were inspected by ASN and found to be satisfactory ASN remains attentive to the satisfactory performance of this phase of the construction site which will require the use of heavy site machinery in order to achieve the final elevation of the channel bottom Manufacture of the polar crane supports During the inspection of 14th December 2011 on the Flamanville 3 site ASN was informed of a number of deviations that occurred during the manufacture of the polar crane supports 2 EDF discovered defects in the support welds in the factory before painting then again on the Flamanville site during complementary inspections ASN asked EDF to inspect a larger number of supports in order to identify the scale of the defects These additional inspections demonstrated the presence of defects on a large number of supports so EDF decided to replace them all and have new polar crane supports manufactured At ASN s request EDF presented ASN and its technical support organisation the Institute for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety with the work undertaken to understand the origin of these numerous defects and to prevent identical defects occurring on other components intended for the Flamanville 3 reactor On 10 October 2012 ASN carried out an inspection to check that the steps actually taken by EDF to prevent defects of the same type on the new supports were implemented in good conditions The inspectors also examined the steps taken by EDF to analyse whether other equipment intended for Flamanville 3 was affected by similar defects The analysis did indeed reveal defects on certain items especially on several handling cranes or their carriages so EDF returned some of the equipment concerned to the factory for repair while dealing with other items in situ At the end of January 2013 EDF had completed the installation of all the new supports in the reactor building Repair of the reactor vessel closure head Since the end of 2010 AREVA NP has been involved in a process to repair deviations on the Flamanville EPR reactor vessel closure head These repairs consist in removing and then completely re doing all the welds and buttering on all the closure head adapters 3 During the second half of 2012 AREVA NP completed the welds and buttering removal phase and carried out a complete inspection of the closure head base metal In December 2012

    Original URL path: http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Inspections/Supervision-of-the-epr-reactor/ASN-s-supervision-of-the-Flamanville-3-reactor-construction-EPR-News/Supervision-of-the-EPR-reactor-Information-notice-No.-14 (2016-01-29)
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  • Supervision of the EPR reactor: Information notice No. 13
    exchanges with STUK the Finnish safety Authority On completion of this inspection ASN considers that EDF s organisation for the construction of this structure is on the whole satisfactory as is EDF oversight of its contractors In addition in March 2012 EDF informed ASN of the presence of empty spaces behind the recesses accommodating the gates 4 of the reactor building pools this partial filling with concrete results from activities that took place in the summer of 2011 before the implementation of additional measures for complex concreting work EDF detected this defect at Flamanville through application of experience feedback from the Olkiluoto reactor where a similar anomaly had been observed The repairs undertaken by EDF were subject to unannounced inspection by ASN on 21st August 2012 Although ASN notes that EDF has endeavoured to turn the experience feedback from the Olkiluoto construction site to good account it will remain attentive to the final construction quality that is to say after inspection and repair of the EPR reactor pools Repair of the reactor vessel closure head AREVA NP informed ASN first at the end of 2010 and then in 2011 of the detection of two major quality deviations during manufacture of the Flamanville EPR reactor vessel closure head The deviations concerned firstly in autumn 2010 detection of a large number of defects in the adapters welds located on the vessel closure head secondly in June 2011 during repair operations to correct the previous defects detection of insufficient thickness in the buttering metal layer located under these welds The processing of these deviations led AREVA NP in July 2011 to propose a large scale repair solution to ASN involving completely redoing several steps in the vessel head manufacturing process The first of these steps consisting in eliminating all the welds and the buttering metal of 50 adapters out of a total of 105 During this step AREVA NP was specifically monitored by the APAVE 5 and ASN The operations ran with no major difficulties other than a machining machine programming anomaly which had no impact on the quality of the vessel closure head but led ASN to suspend the closure head repair operations AREVA NP proposed corrective and preventive measures involving introducing safety mechanisms in the machining programs stepping up internal monitoring and implementing additional checks ASN approved this plan of actions and authorised resumption of the repair operations two months after their suspension An inspection carried out in July 2012 confirmed the progress of the operations following the implementation of these actions and allowed AREVA NP s experience feedback to be examined during this first phase of machining of the welds and butterings No corrective actions were demanded further to this inspection ASN approved the continuation of the repair operations consisting in eliminating the welds and buttering metal from the remaining 55 adapters At the end of this second phase AREVA NP will perform a complete inspection of the closure head base metal under the removed welds After examining the results

    Original URL path: http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Inspections/Supervision-of-the-epr-reactor/ASN-s-supervision-of-the-Flamanville-3-reactor-construction-EPR-News/Supervision-of-the-EPR-reactor-Information-notice-No.-13 (2016-01-29)
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  • I&C architecture of the Flamanville 3 EPR
    nuclear safety and radiation protection authorities International Commission on Radiological Protection Section map Home Inspections Supervision of the epr reactor ASN s supervision of the Flamanville 3 reactor construction EPR News I C architecture of the Flamanville 3 EPR Print Mettre en favoris Share on Inspections European stress tests Supervision of the epr reactor ASN s supervision of the Flamanville 3 reactor construction EPR News ASN s supervision principles for the construction of the Flamanville 3 reactor Resources Project concerning the installation of an EPR type reactor on the Penly site Back to news list ASN lifts its reservations regarding the I C architecture of the Flamanville 3 EPR 16 04 2012 9 30 am Note d information ASN considers that the changes EDF has made to the instrumentation and control I C architecture of the Flamanville 3 EPR are satisfactory and enable it to lift the reservations it expressed in October 2009 This position is based on the analysis by its technical support organisation IRSN and the opinion of the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors I C 1 consists of a range of systems which in a nuclear facility automatically take measurements and perform control or protection functions The I C for the Flamanville 3 EPR reactor comprises two associated platforms see diagram the Téléperm XS platform specifically developed for the nuclear industry and dedicated to reactor protection in incident or accident situations the SPPA T2000 platform which is a conventional industrial system used for functions linked to normal reactor operations and for certain reactor protection operations in incident or accident situations EPR instrumentation and control diagram On 15th October 2009 ASN informed EDF that the safety of the SPPA T2000 platform could not be confirmed ASN in particular asked EDF to provide additional justifications and examine a different design for the I C of the Flamanville 3 EPR reactor On this point ASN together with the regulators from Great Britain ONR formerly HSE and Finland STUK published a joint position statement on the design of the EPR reactor s instrumentation and control system on 2nd November 2009 Since then EDF has been carrying out considerable work to comply with the ASN requests and finally as requested by ASN has implemented an I C architecture modification designed to improve robustness and enable the SPPA T2000 platform to be used for the Flamanville 3 EPR reactor This modification consists in duplicating some of the SPPA T2000 platform s reactor protection functions on the Téléperm XS platform The aim is to improve I C robustness in the event of failure of the SPPA T2000 platform combined with certain accident situations Following the IRSN analysis of these modifications and the 16th June 2011 opinion from the Advisory Committee for nuclear reactors ASN considers that the I C architecture of the EPR reactor proposed by EDF is such as to be able to guarantee the safety of the systems used to manage incident or accident situations and their independence from the control systems

    Original URL path: http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Inspections/Supervision-of-the-epr-reactor/ASN-s-supervision-of-the-Flamanville-3-reactor-construction-EPR-News/I-C-architecture-of-the-Flamanville-3-EPR (2016-01-29)
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  • Supervision of the EPR reactor: information notice No. 12
    a limited number of brackets ASN has asked EDF to conduct additional inspections on other brackets EDF is currently conducting these inspections determining the cause of the defects and thereby defining a corrective strategy ASN will also conduct inspections on this issue The construction of concrete lift 11 inner containment wall will only be initiated after implementation of the solution adopted by EDF to ensure construction quality Oversight of complex concreting operations In July 2011 EDF informed ASN of the detection of rock pockets 3 in certain concrete walls of the reactor building spent fuel pools Further to an inspection conducted on 12 July 2011 see Newsletter No 11 and after technical analysis ASN asked EDF to provide additional information particularly regarding the following final post repair construction quality of affected concrete walls identification of appropriate preventive measures particularly regarding proper assessment of worker qualifications with a view to ensuring full control of future complex concreting operations Based on the information submitted by EDF and the results of inspections conducted on 22 November and 20 December 2011 the technical and organizational measures adopted by EDF to detect and repair such defects and ensure full control of future complex concreting operations appear to be satisfactory Quality control of tank pool and liner welding operations Tank liner installation operations were initiated in late 2010 for certain safety related tanks 4 with particular emphasis on spent fuel pool tanks located in the reactor building and fuel building Given the large number of tanks to be manufactured and their importance for safety ASN attaches particular importance to the oversight of tank manufacturing processes ASN inspections regarding this issue were therefore conducted on 12 January 22 June 16 November and 23 November 2011 and 25 January 2012 Based on the results of these inspections the organizational measures implemented by EDF and the main construction contractor appear to be satisfactory However EDF must pay careful attention to stainless steel sheet metal contamination risks and to ensuring adequate control of sheet metal welding operations particularly during repair work ASN will continue to monitor the proper execution of these activities and the proper implementation of tank lining procedures for spent fuel pool tanks in the reactor building and fuel building ASN report on the complementary safety assessments conducted by EDF after the Fukushima accident On 3 January 2012 ASN issued a report on the complementary safety assessments conducted after the Fukushima incident This report presents the complementary safety assessment results for all basic nuclear installations examined in 2011 including the Flamanville 3 EPR site and the actions to be taken by ASN based on these results Specific requirements are to be imposed on EDF in order to improve the robustness of nuclear facilities beyond existing safety margins under extreme conditions ASN opinion and report on complementary safety assessments are available for public consultation Repair of reactor vessel head AREVA NP has informed ASN of the detection of two significant quality non conformances during manufacture of the reactor vessel

    Original URL path: http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Inspections/Supervision-of-the-epr-reactor/ASN-s-supervision-of-the-Flamanville-3-reactor-construction-EPR-News/Supervision-of-the-EPR-reactor-information-notice-No.-12 (2016-01-29)
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  • Supervision of the EPR reactor: Information notice No. 11
    any cumulative effect In the days which followed EDF presented an action plan which included measures to improve the skills of teams responsible for prestressing sheaths On 1 July 2011 considering that the actions adopted by EDF would result in the proper conduct of work on the prestressing sheaths ASN authorised EDF to pursue concreting activities on the inner containment wall An unscheduled inspection was performed on 12 July 2011 on this issue The conclusion of the inspection is that implementation of EDF s action plan is satisfactory overall see follow up letter INSSN CAE 2011 0662 Reminder regarding complex concreting requirements General view of Reactor Building cavity under construction On 7 July EDF notified ASN that rock pockets 2 had been detected in certain concrete walls of the Reactor Building cavity This information follows several requests for additional information and inspections by ASN regarding the method chosen for concreting the structures In addition to handling such occasional deviations for which repairs were already planned ASN sought to verify if they demonstrated possible organisational lapses strict requirements for the worksite require correct performance of operations to avoid the need for future corrections On 12 July 2011 ASN s inspectors examined measures taken by EDF and its primary civil engineering subcontractor responsible for concreting the Reactor Building cavity Inspectors also examined the defects on site before repair The technical exchange revealed that defects result from the difficulty of pouring concrete in complex shapes with dense reinforcement using the adopted method Among other things inspectors noted that cleaning prior to pouring was incorrectly performed and inspected On 10 August 2011 ASN thus requested EDF to provide a report on the quality of the concrete walls affected by the defects after repairs are completed identify if such complex concreting could have led to defects for which visual inspections are not possible define appropriate preventive measures particularly concerning inspection and skill of workers so that future concreting operations are fully mastered present operating experience feedback or useful lessons contributing to mastering the activity prior to the next complex concreting operations EDF has already given its response which addresses worker training and increasing monitoring of activities by the firms concerned Rock pockets before repair on a wall of the Reactor Building cavity Ongoing examination of instrumentation and control I C system The Flamanville 3 EPR I C system comprises two platforms the Téléperm XS platform specifically developed for the nuclear industry and designed to protect the reactor during incidents and accidents the SPPA T2000 platform a conventional industrial component used for normal reactor operation with certain functions designed to protect the reactor during incidents and accidents In response to ASN s request dated 9 July 2010 EDF presented design measures that differ from those initially planned The measures include grouping certain safety functions that were not part of the Téléperm XS platform in a hard kernel system The measures enable handling a situation which includes complete loss of the SPPA T2000 platform combined with certain

    Original URL path: http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Inspections/Supervision-of-the-epr-reactor/ASN-s-supervision-of-the-Flamanville-3-reactor-construction-EPR-News/Supervision-of-the-EPR-reactor-Information-notice-No.-11 (2016-01-29)
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  • Reactor vessel head for the Flamanville EPR
    assistance plans Multilateral relations outside Europe International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD Other UN organisations Other associations of nuclear safety and radiation protection authorities International Commission on Radiological Protection Section map Home Inspections Supervision of the epr reactor ASN s supervision of the Flamanville 3 reactor construction EPR News Reactor vessel head for the Flamanville EPR Print Mettre en favoris Share on Inspections European stress tests Supervision of the epr reactor ASN s supervision of the Flamanville 3 reactor construction EPR News ASN s supervision principles for the construction of the Flamanville 3 reactor Resources Project concerning the installation of an EPR type reactor on the Penly site Back to news list ASN inspects weld repairs on the reactor vessel head for the Flamanville EPR 26 04 2011 10 49 am Note d information In November 2010 AREVA NP detected defects in several nozzle penetration welds during its regulatory manufacturing inspections of the Flamanville 3 EPR reactor vessel head Purpose and location of EPR vessel head nozzles Nuclear power plant reactor vessel heads are penetrated by nozzles which are designed to allow control rod drive mechanisms and core monitoring instruments through the vessel head into the reactor vessel It is the control rod drive mechanism that controls the nuclear reaction inside the reactor core The EPR vessel head totals more than a hundred such penetrations Under normal operating conditions the pressure inside a nuclear reactor is very high reaching a value of 155 bar Each component passing through the vessel head is welded to the inner surface Welding involves depositing several layers of metal and each weld undergoes regular inspection both during and after the operation using various methods Diagram of vessel head nozzles and welds ASN asked AREVA NP to propose corrective action as these

    Original URL path: http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Inspections/Supervision-of-the-epr-reactor/ASN-s-supervision-of-the-Flamanville-3-reactor-construction-EPR-News/Reactor-vessel-head-for-the-Flamanville-EPR (2016-01-29)
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  • Health and safety inspection at EPR reactor
    European Union Clubs of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Authorities Other organisations Multilateral assistance plans Multilateral relations outside Europe International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD Other UN organisations Other associations of nuclear safety and radiation protection authorities International Commission on Radiological Protection Section map Home Inspections Supervision of the epr reactor ASN s supervision of the Flamanville 3 reactor construction EPR News Health and safety inspection at EPR reactor Print Mettre en favoris Share on Inspections European stress tests Supervision of the epr reactor ASN s supervision of the Flamanville 3 reactor construction EPR News ASN s supervision principles for the construction of the Flamanville 3 reactor Resources Project concerning the installation of an EPR type reactor on the Penly site Back to news list ASN oversees occupational health and safety inspection at French nuclear power plants Update on ASN s inspection of the Flamanville 3 site 19 04 2011 10 41 am Note d information ASN oversees occupational health and safety inspection at French nuclear power plants 1 It provides coordinated oversight of the health safety working conditions and quality of employment of EDF employees as well as those of EDF service providers and subcontractors just as it does for nuclear safety at facilities This activity covers the construction operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants 2 ASN employs 13 inspectors assigned to occupational health and safety activities Their main tasks include carrying out checks using all available means to ensure proper compliance with labour regulations as well as supporting EDF in its efforts to grasp and assimilate regulatory requirements investigating industrial accidents and ensuring that the operator takes the necessary steps to guarantee safe working conditions in some cases granting exemptions from regulations regarding working hours and rest identifying and following industrial disputes wherever

    Original URL path: http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/Inspections/Supervision-of-the-epr-reactor/ASN-s-supervision-of-the-Flamanville-3-reactor-construction-EPR-News/Health-and-safety-inspection-at-EPR-reactor (2016-01-29)
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